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W e have a new Arbitration Act, that of 1996, which largely came into force on 31 
January 1997   save for the provisions 
dealing with 'domestic arbitration 
agreements' which for the time being do 
not apply It applies to any arbitration 
proceedings starting on or after that date. 
The new Act, which repeals all prior 
statutes subject to transitional provisions 
(with the exception of Part 11 of the 
1950 Act   'enforcement of certain 
foreign awards'), has been master- 
minded by Lord Justice Saville and his 
committee. It has received a warm 
welcome. It follows in its own way the 
UN Committee on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, with clarity 
and simplicity and in logical order; and 
its interpretation is assisted by the 
Department Advisory Committee's 
reports, which have been produced to be 
read alongside the Act.
Three themes pervade the Act, spelt 
out in s. 1 :
(1) 'the object oj arbitration is to obtain the 
Jair resolution of disputes by an impartial 
tribunal without unnecessary delay or 
expense ';
(2) 'the parties should be Jree to agree how 
their disputes are resolved, subject only to 
such safeguards as are necessary in the 
public interest';
(3) 'in matters governed by [the main part] of 
the Act the court should not intervene 
except as provided [in that part]'.
Of these themes, the first is given teeth 
by s. 33 of the Act. This is at the heart of 
the new legislation and is a directive to 
arbitration tribunals not only to be fair 
and impartial as between the parties, but 
also to adopt procedures that are 
expeditious and economical according to 
the case in hand.
AUTONOMY
In furtherance of the theme of party 
autonomy, most provisions of the Act 
apply only if the parties fail to agree 
otherwise (either directly or through any 
institutional rules adopted by them). 
Thus, the arbitrators are allowed to 
decide procedural matters only so far as
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parties have not decided otherwise, but 
are allowed, for example (and for the first 
time expressly), to exclude or limit 
discovery of documents and the rules of 
evidence   or to set their own   and the 
tribunal may take the initiative in 
ascertaining facts and law. Unless agreed 
otherwise the tribunal may award 
compound interest and freely fix the rate; 
but the tribunal cannot consolidate 
proceedings or order concurrent 
proceedings (especially useful to multi- 
partite arbitration) unless the parties give 
it that power.
COURT'S ROLE
While the court necessarily retains 
some jurisdiction over arbitrations under 
the new Act, its role is narrower and 
more clearly and precisely defined. The 
grounds of appeal and resort to the court 
are more restricted than before in order 
to implement the parties' wishes to 
arbitrate their disputes. The court must 
order a stay of proceedings in favour of 
arbitration where an agreement exists (as 
defined bv the Act) unless it orders the 
agreement null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of performance. Where an 
arbitration agreement exists, the court 
now has no discretion as to whether or 
not it can take jurisdiction of a matter 
where it is submitted by a party that there 
is no dispute (such as, for example, in 
relation to an unpaid invoice, properly 
due): in such circumstances, whether or 
not a dispute properly exists, the matter 
must be referred to arbitration. Also, the 
general discretion, formerly available as 
to a domestic arbitration agreement 
(broadly one made in the UK between 
UK parties), disappears except where the 
agreement is void, etc., or (if and when 
the domestic arbitration provisions are 
brought into force) the court finds 'other 
sufficient grounds'.
In industries, such as construction, 
this has been much criticised since, prior 
to the new Act, there was a flexibility 
enabling the court to exercise its 
discretion to order a stay of numerous 
arbitrations between numerous parties all 
in relation to the same project or set of 
facts in favour of court proceedings; this
enabled the parties to issue court 
proceedings in relation to such claims, 
thereby enabling joinder and/or 
consolidation. It seems such 
circumstances will not be 'other 
sufficient grounds' under the new Act to 
warrant a stay. Although the Act permits 
consolidation this can occur only by 
agreement of all the relevant parties; 
securing such agreement may not be 
possible. Accordingly, for all its 
enlightenment, there is a concern that 
industries formerly predisposed to 
arbitration will now be inclined to refer 
their disputes to the courts.
INTERVENTION AND 
APPEAL
The arbitration tribunal itself can 
determine its own substantive 
jurisdiction (unless otherwise agreed) 
but the parties' objections must be made 
promptly; and a party can take such an 
objection to a court, if all agree, or if the 
court allows it at its discretion and if the 
application is likely to cause a substantial 
saving of costs, is made without delay and 
the court considers there is 'good reason'
o
for it to decide the issue. A party can also 
challenge in court a tribunal's award on 
its own jurisdiction but this right will be 
lost through delay or submission. The 
court can accept a challenge to an award 
on the ground of 'serious irregularity' 
(roughly what used to be called 
'misconduct') but a party may lose this 
right to object also through delay or 
submission. A court can only (at its 
discretion) consider a preliminary point 
of law if the parties agree or if it is made 
promptly, with the consent of the 
tribunal and in a case where a substantial 
saving in costs is likely. Similarly an 
appeal on a point of law is allowed only if 
the parties have not excluded it (as by 
implication by dispensing with a 
reasoned award) and then only either by 
agreement of the parties or on grounds 
similar to those in Pioneer Shipping v BTP 
Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC 724 (the 'Nema' 
case); the special rules restricting such 
exclusion that applied to shipping, 
insurance and commodity cases are 
abolished.
MARKET-LED
A few general points: the parties can 
select the law applicable to the substance 
of the dispute or other considerations 
agreed by the parties (for example, ex 
aqueo et bono); unless otherwise agreed 
the award must state its reasons; the 
ability to correct or clarify the award is 
strengthened.
All in all, the Act is well prepared 
having been the subject of considerable
consultation and being market-led to 
preserve and enhance the attractiveness 
of this jurisdiction. It provides a platform 
for arbitrators to differentiate 
arbitrations from court proceedings and 
gives the parties (subject to the Act's 
mandatory provisions) a wide element of 
choice to agree how their arbitrations are 
to be conducted.
It will be interesting to see how users 
cope with the extensive freedom now
offered. Institutional bodies will amend 
(or have amended) their rules. Ad hoc 
appointers may not manage to take 
advantage of the possibilities till 
arbitration arises. Experience on these 





Slipping up on bananas?
The completion of the EU's internal market necessitated the unification of diverse national 
policies on banana imports into one 
policy; this came into force in July 1993. 
In the establishment of the trading 
system, among the various factors to be 
reconciled were the Lome Convention's 
banana protocol, which provided lor 
traditional Community imports from the 
ACP and the interests of Latin-American 
countries for whom banana exports were 
of major economic importance. In this 
reconciliation of interests, the need to 
make the regulation consistent with 
international trade law also had to be 
considered. The new regime waso
applauded by ACP producers as it 
allowed for the continuation of their 
traditional exports to the Community. 
However, Latin-American producers 
were very critical ot the regime and a 
complaint was made to the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
yet the reports were not adopted. A 
further complaint was made by Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the 
US to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in 1996.
COMMUNITY IN BREACH
In April 1997 the final report of the 
WTO panel concluded that the 
Community's import regime for bananas 
was inconsistent with various provisions 
of the GATT, the Licensing Agreement 
and the General Agreement on Trading 
Services (GATS). The Community's 
notification of an appeal against this 
report sought to challenge each of the 
specific findings against the Community's1 o o J
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import regime and, more importantly, 
the interpretation of the scope and 
coverage of the waiver granted to the 
Lome Convention and the obligations ofo
the Community under that Convention. 
The Community argued that the waiver 
allowed for preferential treatment to be 
accorded to products, including bananas, 
originating in the ACP states, as required 
by the provisions of the Convention. The 
panel concluded that the Community had 
no obligation under the Convention to 
allocate tariff quota shares to the ACP in 
excess of their best-ever exports to the 
Community as they had under the banana 
regulation. By doing so, the Community 
had acted in breach of art. 13 and this 
breach was not covered by the waiver.
FUTURE AMENDMENT
The existing waiver expires in 2000 by 
which time the Convention will have 
been renegotiated. The Commission has 
offered a menu of six potential trade 
arrangements, none of which are 
problem-free. The ACP clearly would 
like the existing arrangements to 
continue. However, the Commission 
believes that some changes in those 
arrangements are necessary, not least to 
ensure their greater conformity with 
WTO rules. How is this difference to be 
resolved? Moreover could the 
relationship   and some ACP states   
survive the amendment of the banana 
regulation in line with the findings of the 
panel?
The most important factor in this 
resolution is the new atmosphere 
engendered by the WTO which makes it 
evident that the new Convention will be
more consistent with those rules than 
previous Conventions. In terms of 
consistency, some adaptation of the 
existing agreement is necessary. The 
minimum requirement would be to 
introduce some element of reciprocity, 
but not all ACP countries are in a 
position to offer reciprocal concessions. 
If reciprocity is offered and free trade 
areas are contemplated, such areas must 
be consistent with art. 14. This too is 
problematic.
As for the more immediate problem 
facing the Community, the amendment 
of the banana regulation, one argument 
would be that if, after over 20 years of 
co-operation, ACP banana exports 
remain uncompetitive on the 
Community market, perhaps the time 
has come to end that co-operation. The 
economic cost to various ACP states of 
this option is too high to be realistically 
contemplated. If the appellate body 
confirms the panel report, the 
subsequent amendment of the banana 
regulation will need to consider this and 
the renegotiation of the current Lome
O
Convention will have to provide greater 
assistance to the affected ACP states. 
Otherwise, the Community will continue 
to slip up on bananas. ®
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